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Abstract
Studies on local interest groups have generated a considerable number of theories on urban 
power that have eventually become the basis of far-reaching approaches on democracy and 
collective action. Such literature has been especially concerned with discovering who governs 
the city, paving the way for discussions on elitism, pluralism and urban regimes. Some 
approaches consider that the business elite dominates local politics, while other theories assert 
that interests other than business (neighbors, environmentalists, faith-based organizations, 
civic groups) have been gaining relevance and access to local government. The POLLEADER 
survey (2006) provided data on the influence of certain social groups as perceived by mayors 
in Spain. Data showed that the local business community was, at best, as influential and 
active as voluntary associations. With recent data from the POLLEADER II survey (2015), 
this article confirms a certain pluralistic model of local power and, it considers the number of 
inhabitants and the Mayors’ ideology as key factors to determine variation in the way interest 
groups’ influence is perceived.
Keywords: power, interest groups, business, cities, mayors.
Resumen
Los estudios sobre grupos de interés locales han aportado una cantidad notable de teorías sobre 
el poder urbano que, tiempo después, facilitarían el desarrollo de enfoques más amplios sobre 
democracia y acción colectiva. Esta literatura se ha centrado especialmente en descubrir quién 
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gobierna la ciudad con argumentos desde el elitismo, el pluralismo y los regímenes urbanos. 
Algunos enfoques sugieren que la elite empresarial es preponderante en la política local, mien-
tras otras teorías consideran que otros intereses (vecinales, ecologistas, religiosos, cívicos) han 
ido ganando peso y acceso al Gobierno local. La encuesta POLLEADER (2006) ofreció datos 
sobre cómo los alcaldes y las alcaldesas percibían la influencia de ciertos grupos sociales. Los 
datos mostraron que los empresarios locales eran, a lo sumo, tan influyentes y activos como lo 
eran las asociaciones voluntarias. Con datos de la encuesta POLLEADER II (2015), este artí-
culo confirma la existencia de un modelo pluralista de poder local, a la vez que identifica el 
tamaño del municipio y la ideología del Alcalde como los factores clave para determinar la 
variación en la percepción de la influencia de los grupos de interés.
Palabras clave: poder, grupos de interés, empresarios, ciudades, alcaldes. 
INTRODUCTION
City politics, referring to concepts related to government (public administration, 
political legitimacy, etc.), representation (local democracy, leadership, interest mobi-
lization, etc.), and outcomes (public services, public policies, etc.), is currently gener-
ating challenges in terms of huge politico-societal demands. Everything takes place in 
cities, from political protests against globalization to the local settlement of refugees, 
from industrial renewal to underground cultural movements. Nowadays, local gov-
ernments are tackling new metropolitan conflicts that relate to the way cities seek 
economies of scale, as well as to the emergence of supra-municipal conflicts, for exam-
ple related to infrastructure for transportation, economic growth and industrial dis-
tricts, poverty and social exclusion, new technological connections and so on. This 
directly relates to classic discussions concerning the size of municipalities, the difficul-
ties in consolidating metropolitan areas and the overall debate on how to design good 
spatial policies (Bassand and Kübler, 2001; Erlingsson and Ödalen, 2013), as well as 
current preoccupations regarding the impact of the economic crisis on local policy 
agendas and on local democracy. 
A vast number of new concepts have emerged during the last decade to capture the 
many transformations happening at the local level, namely, metropolitanization, cos-
mopolitan localism, spatial mobility, urban sprawl, the functional specialization of 
space, and so on (Kübler, 2012). This indicates that society and markets are shifting 
rapidly, making city politics react accordingly. The recent economic crisis has served 
as a catalyst for speeding up reforms everywhere; however, it is fair to say that local 
governments have long been under pressure from both external inducements and 
internal pushes to accommodate political demands as well as administrative needs to 
a very great extent1. 
1. The recurrent example of this is Thatcher’s legacy on changing rules and organisational dynam-
ics in local governments in the United Kingdom (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000). Other 
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The research carried out by the POLLEADER II project on the transformations of 
local governments in Spain in recent times shows that local governments have been 
(and still are) looking for multiple ways to find their own space in the multi-level gov-
ernance developed in the last decades in the country. Although media attention mostly 
turns to levels of government other than local authorities, we cannot ignore the argu-
ment raised by Botella (1992), who points out that the Spanish tradition conceives the 
municipality as the starting point when it comes to the regeneration of the political 
system. Since 1978, Spanish local governments have focused on the modernization of 
administrative structures, the redistribution of scarce resources, adaptation to a series 
of supra-municipal structures (Diputaciones, Consejos Comarcales), the creation of 
mechanisms of local democracy, as well as the management of a growing number 
of policy issues that, in many cases, have not been under the formal responsibility of 
local authorities2. 
This article addresses one key aspect within the broad topic of “local democracy”3, 
namely the exercise of political influence in city politics, which is often regarded from a 
twofold angle: the mayor’s capacity to maintain his/her political autonomy from inter-
nal and external pressures, on the one hand; and the existence of “channels of admin-
istrative accountability” so that citizens can control —and eventually punish— local 
politicians, on the other. This has long been one of the main topics of the literature on 
local governments. Since its origins, the goal has been to determine who governs the 
instances follow suit. Alba and Navarro assessed the motivations behind local reforms in Spain 
from mid-1850 onwards and concluded that “reform attempts have always been a top-down 
process, and policy entrepreneurs have mainly been organizationally based in the prime minis-
ter’s office and, more recently, in the ministry of public administration” (2011: 785). Similarly, 
in federal and quasi-federal states, regional governments often show centralist positions around 
local projects in relation to the distribution of territorial power. This implies that local gov-
ernments end up suffering a dual hierarchical constraint both from the state and the regions.
2. Of course, as Wollman (2012) argues, particularities are to be given special attention when it 
comes to contextualising local government reforms. Local governments, although emerging 
from solid roots in most European countries, mostly the Nordic ones, are greatly embedded in 
multi-level structures and logics and thus they cannot escape from national-based debates on 
public administration reforms in their entirety. Despite various attempts to bring up a limited 
number of local government traditions in Europe, be it as a North/South divide or as a lead-
ership-pattern model (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002), we cannot just tiptoe around the fact that 
local governments in Sweden are responsible for hiring two-thirds of the entire public sector 
personnel, whereas in Spain this figure barely stood at 23 per cent at the beginning of the last 
decade (Alba and Navarro, 2003) and roughly amounts to around a modest fifteen per cent 
in Italian municipalities. Other notable differences apply to budgets, competences and career 
promotion. 
3. Local democracy includes multiple issues and discussions, ranging from the study of local pol-
icy competencies and institutional structures to issues related to political behaviour and polit-
ical participation. This article is moderate in its claims. The objective here is to analyse a very 
specific subject, namely that of influence and transparency.
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city. Elitist approaches considered local authorities were exposed to the pressure of 
business groups, which could potentially favor the formation of a business elite likely 
to control local politics. Pluralism claims no interest dominates politics as a whole.
In this vein, we pose two research questions. The first question relates directly to 
the topic of local power in the terms discussed in the literature: “Do Spanish mayors 
feel businesspeople are the most influential group in local politics?” The second ques-
tion addresses a wider topic on local politics and interest groups in that we attempt to 
examine, beyond the perception of influence, how local interest groups seek influence 
locally. It is important to mention we are not dealing here with the (always problem-
atic topic of) measurement of interest group influence on specific domains. We exam-
ine data on how mayors understand various access-related aspects, such as meeting 
(Cotton, 2012), attention (Binderkrantz et al., 2015) and contact (Dür and Mateo, 
2013). The question is: “How do local interest groups access local politics?” Therefore, 
the former question relates to the “perception of power” and the latter one addresses 
interest groups’ access to local decision-making.
This article considers these different angles in structuring the content as follows: 
first, we discuss the main theories on interest groups at the local level, closely related 
to a much broader discussion on the concentration/dispersion of power. Second, the 
article offers an empirical analysis of the survey of Spanish mayors conducted by the 
POLLEADER II project. We opt for an analysis in which the perception of influence 
and interest group strategies are correlated with relevant variables such as the size of the 
city, the mayor’s ideology and the mayor’s policy priorities. To capture variance by 
the type of interest group, the analysis focuses on local businesses, voluntary associa-
tions, trade unions and the Church. The final remarks summarize the main conclu-
sions and open the debate on local transparency, a topic that will guide future research 
on local interest groups in Spain. 
LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND INTEREST GROUPS
The study of urban power started back in the 1950s with the debate on the com-
munity power launched by Hunter’s (1953) elitist approach. Studies on local power 
prior to 1950 envisaged urban dynamics as a result of a Darwinian competition. Social 
groups seemed to organize themselves biologically in the cities, and they behaved 
according to utilitarian principles in migratory, segregation, and localization issues. As 
cities were an evolutionary body, these studies were not concerned with decision-mak-
ing. Power simply was the result of urban adaptation. The reaction from community 
power theorists was to bring politics back in. Whether it took an elitist standpoint or 
it followed the pluralist approach, the new wave of studies on urban power considered 
that the development of cities was the result of decisions made by those who had the 
power (and the responsibility to govern) in the cities (Harding, 2009).
Hunter suggested business was the mightiest power in city politics, for power was 
unevenly distributed among politicians, administrators and business leaders. Hunter 
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asserted the existence of a dominant alliance between businesses and local politicians, 
leading to all local decisions benefiting local businesses. Years later, Dahl (1961) came 
up with his famous pluralist approach. The pluralists suggested that no individual 
exerts influence over all municipal arenas, although there may be individuals who are 
particularly influential in one area. Dahl —and also Polsby (1963)— argued that 
power is much more dispersed than elitists actually believe. Pluralist authors regarded 
the influence of a particular collective —or organized group— to be sectoral, so it var-
ies across policy areas. It also varies over time. 
Since then, the discussion on urban power has focused on two dimensions: on the 
one hand, the question of the existence of competing local elites —and the dispersion 
of local power; on the other hand, if the business elite dominates local politics (Abney 
and Lauth, 1985; Elkins, 1995). Regarding the first dimension, there has always been 
a certain consensus that power is dispersed among various actors and institutions, 
whether we credit individuals as “gatekeepers” for local policies (Buchanan, 1982) or 
we support the existence of key organized agents (Stoker, 1995). The point in this 
regard is to determine how big —or small— is the network of actors with real power. 
The definition of “real power” considers the most influential groups in terms of 
resources, access, contact and visibility, which seems to result from organizational and 
institutional factors. Local authorities’ institutional architecture and powers definitely 
matter. The particularities of local government in the United States contributes to the 
sense that interest groups somehow capture local politics, while studies on European 
cities conclude that local politics are the result of constant interactions among local 
political parties, local institutions, local leaders and local associations (Goldsmith, 
2006). Stoker and Wilson (1991) perfectly captured this idea in the following terms:
Here it is worth noting that it would be unwise to assume that what occurs in 
the United States will be paralleled in Britain. The tradition and capacity for local 
business involvement is greater in the United States. Their local government system 
is arguably more open to a “take-over” by business interests. There is an absence in 
the U.S.A. of a strongly organized and ideological party politics at the local level. 
The scale of local councils in the U.S.A. is generally smaller in terms of the popula-
tions they were and the professional and organizational resources at their disposal 
(Stoker and Wilson, 1991: 30).
Regarding the latter dimension, although the emergence of the pluralist approach 
tried to explain that power was diffuse and that the elitist approach did not have 
much practical application, the neo-elitist theorists (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) 
criticized the supposed neutrality with which pluralists selected policy areas. For 
neo-elitists, power escapes from formal decisions, since often the ‘real’ elite condi-
tions the issues that enter the agenda, beyond competing for minor bureaucratic 
decisions. The neo-pluralist response came from Lindblom (1977) who pointed out 
that the entrepreneurs’ power in urban politics was not due to abstract processes of 
domination. Otherwise, entrepreneurs are privileged by both business’ structural 
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power (they are necessary for jobs, public welfare) and the instrumental one (the 
ability to mobilize their interests effectively). In any case, that businesses are influ-
ential does not mean that the representative government lacks authority mecha-
nisms. The point is, following Peterson (1981), that cities cannot afford the flight of 
companies, so the City Council is somehow determined to support businesspeople 
as one of the key urban actors.
Accepting that local democracies must coexist with the forces of the free market is 
the principle of the urban regime analysis. Urban regime theory (Stone, 1989) considers 
local governments to be concerned primarily with implementing their own agenda of 
industrial and social growth, so they seek coalitions with private actors with which to 
carry out public services. All actors are constrained by their environment, so local 
power is about how actors make policies happen; therefore, they form a regime. For 
local regime we must understand the ‘circle of powerful administrators and elected 
officials who move in and out the office’ (Fainstain and Frainstain, 1983: 256). Stone 
(1989) suggested the analysis of local power should study the power to carry out 
objectives, instead of examining power over others. Stone’s study of local politics in 
Atlanta identified the existence of a stable coalition among white downtown business 
groups, Black middle class organizations, and elected officials from a succession of city 
administrations, which they all cooperated over the years for the development of local 
policies (Mossberger, 2009). The interests of the various members of the coalition 
were divergent, but even so they found a way to cooperate for the collective benefit.
Although labor union officials, party members, leaders of non-profit organizations 
and church leaders may also be engaged, businesses are meant to have privileged access 
“because of the scope of resources and expertise they command and cities require for 
economic development and/or fiscal solvency” (De Socio, 2007: 340)4. Clearly, the for-
mation of coalitions requires the strategic participation of actors with resources, so we 
can expect more dedication from the business community. In any case, Stone (1989: 
175-6) points out that not all potential coalitions are equally attractive for business, so 
this would allow other social groups to lead initiatives without a business-driven mindset.
A similar argument is made by the growth-machine thesis (Logan and Molotch, 
1987). These authors argue that local businesses are one of the main poles of local 
activity in that they instigate investments, initiate businesses and launch development 
strategies. Local businesses seek the support of various actors in the city, especially the 
municipal authorities, also interested in local growth. Studies on urban governance 
also consider interactions between local authorities and local businesses to be more 
intense than with other types of actors (Navarro-Yáñez et al., 2008). Speaking on the 
4. It is true that Stone’s theory is critical of the pluralistic view, although it is not as determinis-
tic as the early elitist approaches. Stone (1993) points out that dominant actors vary depend-
ing on the type of regime in the city: developmental regimes label local business as preferred 
allies as the basic concern is economic development; maintenance regimes also hinge on local 
businesses as they aim to keep the city from deteriorating; middle-class progressive regimes that 
promote social justice prevent local businesses from becoming the dominant elite.
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political governance of urban peripheries, Salet and Savini stated that “private organ-
izations, business associations, and investment consortia are playing a pioneer role 
because of their knowledge, strategic capacity, and capital portfolios that permit them 
to influence the strategic agendas of public authorities” (2015: 449).
However, a number of studies suggest that neighborhood groups, environmental 
groups, religious groups, trade unions and minority groups are also relevant to the 
promotion of social issues in local politics (DeLeon, 1992; Mesch and Schwirian, 
1996; Browning et al., 2003; Sharp, 2003; Feiock et al., 2014; Cooper et al., 2005). 
These groups are not seen as solvers of all local problems, but they are indispensable 
for the promotion of political participation and the balance of local forces. In particu-
lar, municipal governments that promote welfare policies work closely with civic asso-
ciations, whether these groups defend special interests (civic, ethnic, female, the 
elderly) or more generally the quality of life in the city (Ramírez-Pérez et al., 2008). 
Raising taxes is a measure that is quite unpopular, so cities collaborate with local asso-
ciations in the development of welfare policies, even to make some noise against a 
decision taken by supra-local levels such as water privatization (Fitch, 2007). Some 
authors have developed the resource dependence thesis to explain the symbolic 
relevance of these groups, such as, for instance, Braun-Poppelars (2007), who looks at 
the case of immigration policy in Dutch cities. Braun-Poppelars argues that civic asso-
ciations are important because they inform about the conditions of minority commu-
nities (ibid). 
The discussion on local power reserves an important space for the Marxist approach 
on urban politics (Geddes, 2009). Although the other approaches are based on a more 
or less applied conception of power among various actors that seek to delimit the 
agenda and distribute access to resources, Marxism regards local power as an example 
of the contradiction in the capital accumulation. For Marxist authors, there is no rea-
son to separate the study of cities from the study of capitalism. Local politics are noth-
ing but the struggle over the control of space (Smith, 1991). The city becomes a 
distinctive space within the capitalist state, in which ideological categories can be 
applied on the real meaning of ‘the urban,’ ‘the bourgeoisie,’ ‘property,’ and ‘the ter-
ritory.’ The ideological component seems to be necessary when the cities happen to be 
conditioned by property values, and the consequent process of commercialization of 
rental contracts that displace the working classes to the urban margins (Harvey, 1973). 
As an outstanding example, Lefèbvre (1991) speaks of the urban ‘space of spectacle’ as 
a way of referring to the offer of local experiences to be consumed (i.e. festivals and 
mega-events), which turn cities into a place of/for entertainment. The ‘invented city’ 
conceals social inequalities. The city becomes a place of consumption and, as a conse-
quence, it also becomes a place where social movements emerge to resist collective 
consumption (Castells, 1978).
In general, Marxists focus on the rise of local neoliberalism and its consequences. 
It is a process of change from welfare to workfare, in which the market seeks to restore 
the power of the economic elites. This process revolves around a mode of governance 
that favors business leadership and the growing participation of the private sector in 
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public management (Jessop, 2002). In such a way, cities are ‘spaces of neoliberalism’ 
in which processes of liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and so on, take place. 
Another relevant aspect is the growing integration of cities in the global economy 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002), which affects the way cities are forced to compete with 
each other in the creation of City-brands, and the emergence of entrepreneurial strat-
egies. Of course, this means a growing legitimacy of control over the protests against 
social inequalities.
Despite the particularities of each of the theoretical approaches, all of them with 
very different policy frames and research purposes, the literature on urban power sug-
gests three hypotheses:
H1. Business groups are the most influential type of group in local politics.
H2. Other non-business groups are also influential, but their power depends on the 
public agenda in each of the cities.
H3. Reformist governments are less susceptible to the influence of local groups than 
non-reformist governments.
The other aspect of influence is interest group access to decision making. The main 
issue concerning access is how interest groups develop their influence strategies. Grant 
(1978) argued that group strategies are determined by their relative position within 
decision making. Groups with access and legitimacy (insider groups) engage in formal 
negotiation with members of government (and parliament), while groups opposed to 
the government are forced to develop outsider strategies. Binderkrantz et al. have 
recently raised the concern that “access points are not of equal value across political 
arenas and especially not across political systems” (2016: 13). In this research on 
Spanish cities, the mayors seem to be the main point of access in the local arena, at 
least considering that Spain falls within the “strong mayor” typology (Mouritzen and 
Svara, 2002).
A number of studies have recently delved into the motives that lead groups to 
develop their particular lobbying strategies and point to a clear connection between 
the type of interest group, members’ background and organizational costs. Hane-
graaff et al. (2016) consider that organizational aspects markedly define group strat-
egies, having analyzed organizational maintenance risks. The authors consider that 
business groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) face the same sort of 
risks, so both types of group are able to develop all kinds of strategies. However, the 
study is focused on the international arena, so the NGOs considered are presumably 
strong at the organizational level. Studies focusing on levels other than the transna-
tional level point to a connection between the type of group and the strategies they 
develop. For instance, Binderkrantz assumes “groups with corporate resources direct 
much attention towards influencing the bureaucracy. Public interest groups are more 
likely to use publicly visible strategies where affecting the media agenda play a central 
role” (2008: 192). In a previous article, Binderkrantz (2005) concludes that promo-
tional groups are more inclined towards outsider strategies than other groups because 
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of the need to be visible in order to attract members. Similarly, Dür and Mateo point 
out that “business associations rely much more heavily on an inside strategy than cit-
izen groups, whereas resource-poor groups of both types converge on an outside 
strategy” (2013: 672). The application of these ideas to the local level is timely in 
raising the hypothesis that business groups are inclined to develop formal consulta-
tion strategies with local government, while voluntary associations would be likely to 
develop outsider strategies.
THE PERCEPTION OF POWER IN LOCAL POLITICS IN SPAIN
The starting point in our analysis of the influence of interest groups in the Spanish 
local arena is Navarro’s (2016) study included in the book Los grupos de interés en 
España (Molins et al., 2016), which happens to be the only research that offers a spe-
cific look at this topic. Navarro points out that local associations were the germs of 
democratic political participation of Spaniards in the early days of the transition to 
democracy in the late 1970s. Spaniards began to organize themselves in neighborhood 
associations with a clear political intention to transform neighborhoods and struggle 
for social improvements, demanding improvements in the infrastructure of cities, in 
housing policy, in public transport and in schools. These associations emerged in the 
heat of the urbanization processes of the 1960s, when there was a great rural exodus 
to large cities such as Madrid and Barcelona. These associations became advocates of 
social demands given the political situation of the moment and the lack of political 
pluralism as leftist activists especially nourished them. Neighborhood associations 
helped create the “history of the city”, particularly in urban areas without strong social 
capital. This gave a collective identity to the neighborhoods and established spaces for 
mobilization. After the first democratic municipal elections held in 1979, the neigh-
borhood associations started losing social leadership as they faced an intense reduction 
in terms of members and resources to the benefit of political parties. Neighborhood 
associations were still in force, but they tended towards ideological radicalization. In 
addition, the new constitutional framework of liberties encouraged citizens to form all 
kinds of specific associations in the fields of culture, business, education, sports, lei-
sure, and youth.
Beyond the voluntary motivations of individuals when it comes to forming asso-
ciations, it seems that the thematic range of local associations is restricted, at least by 
the matter of political structure. Local governments in Spain are responsible, in par-
ticular, for three major policy areas: a) policies aimed at urban maintenance and basic 
social services; b) urban, educational and public health policies, although these poli-
cies are usually shared with other supra-municipal levels; c) policies aimed at cultural 
promotion (women, local festivals, music) and social inclusion (immigrants, the 
elderly, housing). This implies that the municipal level is fertile ground for interest 
groups that defend interests related to community wellbeing, such as neighbourhood 
associations, and interests related to the cultural and social spheres, both in promoting 
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causes and in defence of specific public interests5. Nowadays, the economic crisis has 
created an ideal international conjuncture for the emergence of the 15M Movement, 
with notable anchorage in Madrid and in Barcelona, from which solidarity networks 
have been derived (food banks for the poor, protests against evictions)6.
Diversity is the most remarkable characteristic of the myriad of local associations 
in Spain to this day. The main Spanish city councils have agreed on the need to artic-
ulate local associations due to the existence of thousands of voluntary groups that seek 
to contribute to social and political development. One of the most recurrent instru-
ments is the establishment of registers of associations through which to visualize the 
local associative network in each city, as well as making the participatory process more 
transparent. The registers of associations of the main Spanish cities account for the 
formal existence of thousands of associations, many of them with political aspirations 
and many others focused on meeting their members’ demands, such as the majority 
of sports clubs. It should be emphasized that only associations with political inten-
tions, meaning that they have a representative vocation, can be considered interest 
groups by nature, something that is changing greatly at the municipal level. These reg-
isters offer really useful information, although in some cases the data may be slightly 
artificial as being registered is the requirement to access municipal subsidies and for 
eligibility to manage public services (for instance, sports facilities, health care centers, 
immigrant care services and care for people with disabilities). 
With this in mind, a first comment on the registers is that local employers’ associ-
ations represent a very moderate percentage of the total number of local associations, 
while education-driven and culture-oriented associations represent the lion’s share of 
the local associative realm. As Table 1 shows, this is the case for Malaga, Zaragoza, 
Seville, Madrid, Barcelona and Santiago de Compostela with data as of January 20177. 
Associations operating in the health sector are numerous in this random sample of cit-
ies and generally in all large cities in Spain. The main reason for this is the decentrali-
zation of health services in Spain and the municipalization of social assistance. These 
associations fulfil a double mission: they engage in the management of outsourced ser-
vices and inform the administration about specific health needs. Women’s associa-
tions are also among the leading entities within Spanish cities. Political awareness of 
women’s underrated position in society has motivated activism from various feminist 
5. However, cities are also an ideal place for grassroots politics, which are not always articulated in 
the form of interest groups. In recent decades, there have been protests against a wide range of 
issues, with varying degrees of intensity over time. In the 1990s, there was a revitalisation of the 
squatter movement in Madrid, still going to the present day with the Patio Maravillas (also in 
Barcelona with Can Vies), as well as protests against the Prestige in several Galician cities. There 
was also a rise in protests of an ecological nature and in defence of the territory in many munic-
ipalities in Catalonia (Plataforma en defensa de l’Ebre) and Valencia (Salvem el Cabanyal).
6. Although this article does not examine political protest at the local level, the emergence of 
political entrepreneurs from the local associations and movements deserves further research.
7. This is a random selection of cities for informative purposes only.
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sectors. Many of these associations collaborate intensively with local administrations 
in the management of programmes for the promotion of women’s labor and against 
gender violence. Other associations are small in numerical terms but of massive value 
to local governments as they are useful for reaching minority sectors, for example in 
the case of immigrant associations (Navarro, 2014).
Table 1.
The nature of local associations in six Spanish cities (as of Jan 2017)
Type of association
Malaga Zaragoza Seville Madrid Barcelona Santiago de Compostela
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Neighbourhood 297 12 123 4,7 199 7,2 187 9,3 262 4,7 62 10,5
Culture 591 23,8 909 34,5 880 31,9 354 17,5 1577 28,3 121 20,5
Sports 256 10,3 460 17,5 319 11,6 162 8 550 9,9 204 34,6
Social work/rights 224 9 420 16 110 4 280 13,9 364 6,6 7 1,2
Consumers 10 0,4 13 0,5 13 0,5 22 1,1 11 0,2 1 0,2
Immigrants N/A – 15 0,6 N/A – 66 3,3 120 2,2 3 0.5
Elderly 103 4,1 31 1,2 41 1,5 43 2,1 186 3,4 6 1
Youth 185 7,4 104 4 58 2,1 87 4,3 250 4,5 43 7,3
Women 125 5 56 2,1 126 4,6 70 3,5 173 3,1 22 3,7
Education 
(parents) 201 8,1 208 7,9 219 8 385 19 644 11,6 10 1,7
Business/
professionals 74 3 122 4,6 98 3,6 90 4,5 361 6,5 25 4,2
Environment/
animals 46 1,9 N/A – 52 1,9 28 1,4 171 3,1 8 1,4
Health 155 6,2 96 3,6 516 18,7 164 8,1 437 7,9 66 11,2
Foreign aid 132 5,3 18 0,7 28 0,9 49 2,4 329 5,9 11 1,9
Religious/local 
culture 86 3,5 59 2,2 96 3,5 35 1,7 119 2,1 N/A –
N 2485 2634 2755 2022 5554 589
Source: registers of local associations from each of the cities’ websites.
Data from the registers provide information on the associative ecology, but say lit-
tle on local power; there is no information on interest groups’ access to local govern-
ment, either. Methodologically, the study of urban influence can be carried out in 
various ways, all with strengths and limitations. Each of the schools propose a particu-
lar way of approaching the topic, being useful the study of various dimensions like 
formal decision-making, non-formal decision-making, the distribution of private 
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property, informal alliances among diverse social groups, and so on. Among the pos-
sible research strategies, a first one is to study municipal decisions to analyze the win-
ners and losers within all groups. Although this is the path used by the main studies 
on urban power, the difficulty of analyzing municipal decisions in depth makes them 
quite specific to just one city (Atlanta, New Haven, Chicago). Another way is to study 
the institutional participation of local associations in forums such as municipal coun-
cils. The problem of analyzing the formal participation of associations is that informal 
channels of interaction are not taken into account, which has been proven to be 
unsound (Parés et al., 2012).
The third option is to consult local associations on their perception of influence, 
leading to an exercise of data verification and identification of real interest groups among 
the entire set of associations. Data show massive numbers of associations per municipal-
ity, which would force us to reduce the number of cities under research. The fourth 
strategy is to survey the mayors who happen to be the main political actors of their cities, 
at least in the Spanish case. Mayors know their cities and they are aware of the political 
interactions between the administration and relevant groups. It is evident that the study 
of influence here will be somewhat biased, but the perception of influence will always be 
subjective. The decision to take into consideration the mayors’ opinions leads us to con-
ceptualize power in its most relational aspect, for we are going to consider the contact 
that Spanish mayors have with local groups. This way, we will consider neither the pos-
sible coalitions between social groups that exist in each of the cities in the survey, nor the 
property of local resources despite its valuable explanatory power. The purpose is to 
achieve a general picture of local influence in a large number of Spanish municipalities, 
while other strategies would require specific case studies.
Navarro (2016) considers interest group influence through mayors’ lenses. She 
examines the Political Leaders in European Local Governments (POLLEADER) data-
base, which is based on questionnaires to the mayors of municipalities with more than 
10 000 inhabitants in 17 European countries for the year 2006. The first conclusion 
of her work is that business groups and voluntary associations (single-issue groups) 
had, at that time, a moderate influence on local politics. This is a feature that differen-
tiated Spain from countries like Poland, Sweden and Hungary, where local businesses’ 
influence was greater than that of other cause groups. Trade unions and the Church 
had a relatively low influence on local affairs, which is explained by the residual par-
ticipation of local governments in labor and religious matters.
Our article intends to discuss the validity of this first round of conclusions, as well 
as to indicate the applicability of the hypotheses derived from the literature on urban 
power. There are two main reasons for this. The first one is to examine whether we can 
identify a solid trend in the way the distribution of power is observed in Spanish cit-
ies. If a clear trend is not observed, the second reason is to assess the extent to which 
the context of economic crisis has impacted on local dynamics, taking into account 
that the theoretical contributions indicate a certain revitalization of business postu-
lates. In that case, the temporal comparison between the first and the second rounds 
leads us to have a better image of local groups’ influence.
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The database comes from the second round of the mayor survey conducted by the 
POLLEADER II project, in collaboration with European partners, which in Spain has 
collected the views of 303 mayors from cities with more than 10 000 inhabitants. The 
questionnaire was distributed in 2015. Part of the questionnaire was devoted to topics 
of local democracy, including questions about the influence of certain actors on local 
politics and the more recurring lobbying strategies from local businesses, trade unions, 
the Church, and voluntary associations. In particular, we are concerned with the follow-
ing two questions: no. 28 “What kind of means do the following actors use to achieve 
their goals in your municipality?”. The mayors could indicate between institutional 
mechanisms (formal negotiations, litigation), grassroots strategies, or presence in the 
media. Also question no. 34: “On the basis of your experience as a mayor in this city, 
and independently from the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of 
the following actors are over the local authority activities”. These two questions asked 
about local businesses, trade unions, voluntary associations, and religious groups. 
To begin with the topic of urban power, figure 1 shows that interest groups are 
moderately influential in local politics but they are, by no means, the dominant actors 
in local politics. Contrary to the literature, Spanish mayors do not feel local businesses 
Figure 1.
Spanish mayors approach to the influence of local actors in Spain
Note: Responses to the question “On the basis of your experience as a mayor in this city, and independently from the 
formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the local authority activities”. 
Responses range from 0 (no influence) to 5 (high influence).
Source: 2015 POLLEADER II Survey. Spain.
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are the most influential group, whereas both voluntary associations and local busi-
nesses also enjoy considerable levels of local influence. Actors linked to the govern-
ment and administration, namely the mayor, the Executive Board, local MPs and 
local bureaucrats, are the ones possessing the greatest influence in municipal affairs. 
This perception fits in perfectly with the type of local government suggested by the lit-
erature on local governments, which portrays the mayor as the most important polit-
ical figure in the city. This point raises the importance of considering elected officials 
as “gatekeepers” when it comes to influencing local decisions and as a result, the study 
of local power in Spain must recognize the importance of institutions. Social groups 
appear to be moderately influential actors, although some of them barely influence the 
municipal agenda (trade unions, the Church).
A more detailed analysis of the data in Figure 1 shows some variation in the per-
ception of different social groups’ influence. Given the idea that local businesses might 
be more influential in large cities, the businessmen’s influence seems to grow slightly 
as the number of inhabitants of the city increases (see figure 2). This variation is 
explained by the big cities’ greater political capacity, as well as their greater economic 
Figure 2.
Interest group influence by number of inhabitants
Note: Responses to the question “On the basis of your experience as a mayor in this city, and independently from the 
formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the local authority activities”. 
Responses range from 0 (no influence) to 5 (high influence).
Source: 2015 POLLEADER II Survey. Spain.
Revista Española de Ciencia Política. Núm. 46. Marzo 2018, pp. 77-102
Local interest groups and the perception of power in Spanish cities 91
dynamism. This explanation also applies to the case of voluntary associations and 
trade unions. Large cities generate a greater number of political opportunities, for they 
boost more intense social and political dynamism. The key point here is that voluntary 
associations are the most influential type of group regardless of the number of inhab-
itants in the city. The influence of the Church decreases as the number of inhabitants 
increases. Large cities are characterized by a greater bureaucratization of social services, 
as well as by a greater diversity of school and care facilities. The Church finds a larger 
number of competitors in the management of care services, as well as greater religious 
diversity. This is why the “social presence” of the Church is more diffuse in large cities.
At all times, the data reflect mayors’ subjective opinion, which is conditioned by 
their ideology. One such instance of ideological bias would be that leftist mayors max-
imize the influence of the businesspeople and the Church with the intention of rein-
forcing the involvement of the city council in the local economy. Conservative mayors 
can argue the opposite, meaning that local businesses are not as influential as the left 
claims. Figure 3 presents the correlation between the influence of the groups and the 
ideology of the mayors measured on a 0/10 scale. The data support an alternative 
Figure 3.
Interest group influence by mayors’ ideology
Note: Responses to the question “On the basis of your experience as a mayor in this city, and independently from the 
formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the local authority activities”. 
Responses range from 0 (no influence) to 5 (high influence). Mayor’s ideology is measured in a 0-10 scale in which 0 
is extreme left and 10 is far-right.
Source: 2015 POLLEADER II Survey. Spain.
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hypothesis. In general, the mayor’s ideology seems a relevant factor when it comes to 
explaining variation in the perception of interest groups’ influence. Leftist mayors per-
ceive lower levels of influence of all groups, while the perception of influence increases 
as mayors position themselves towards a stronger conservative vision. The influence of 
voluntary associations scarcely varies, but there is a clear impact when it comes to local 
businesses and the Church. In this regard, conservative mayors assume positive aspects 
attached to the influence of these groups and, as a result, they are more likely to gain 
insider status with conservative mayors.
The notion of insider status entails that the government favors the access of certain 
groups with which it shares an ideological and policy affinity. The discussion concerning 
figure 3 suggests that mayors with more conservative (or moderate) positions preferen-
tially pursue objectives related to the economic growth of the city, as opposed to objec-
tives related to the strengthening of local welfare. The discussion of interest group 
influence as a positive element is present in figure 4, which links the perception of influ-
ence to mayors’ main policy objective (either social policies or economic growth). May-
ors whose objective is the economic development of the city tend to believe that local 
businesses have greater influence on local affairs than mayors who prioritize social 
Figure 4.
Interest group influence by mayors’ policy priority
Note: Responses to the question “On the basis of your experience as a mayor in this city, and independently from the 
formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the local authority activities”. 
Responses range from 0 (no influence) to 5 (high influence). 
Source: 2015 POLLEADER II Survey. Spain.
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policies. Conversely voluntary associations end up being the most influential group 
when the city prioritizes social policies. Figure 4 confirms Hypothesis 2, although a 
small distinction should be made: mayors with a priority other than the city’s economic 
growth are likely to reduce their dependence on local businesses, but this does not mean 
that the influence (or positive stance) of the other groups grows massively. 
Regarding interest group strategies, figure 5 shows that formal meetings the between 
local government and social leaders are the most recurring lobbying strategy in all cases. 
In the specific literature on interest groups, data point to access to local institutions 
being much less demanding than access to upper levels of government. A closer look at 
figure 5 allows us to extract valuable information about the preferences of the different 
groups. Business groups are insider groups that seek formal channels of interaction. 
Local businesses seldom protest in the streets. They rather choose to litigate with the 
administration when their interests are not matched. In this regard, local businesses are 
very similar to the Church. Voluntary associations and unions are “high-profile insider 
groups”, that is to say, groups with access to municipal government that use the media 
to raise public awareness for their campaigns. This also explains their determination con-
cerning political protest, as demonstrations at the local level help increase media impact.
Figure 5.
Interest group strategies at the local level
Note: Responses to the question “What kind of means do the following actors use to achieve their goals in your 
municipality?”. Columns indicate the percentage of mayors who recognize the use of each of the strategies by the 
groups. Percentages are presented in a range from 0 to 1. 
Source: 2015 POLLEADER II Survey. Spain.
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Considering that pressure strategies are determined by the resources available in the 
political context, pressure strategies are conditioned by the number of competitors, the 
pressure to attract members and the ability of the group to be visible. Previously, data 
have highlighted the connection between the municipality size and influence. As for 
group strategies, this connection also seems to prove correct. Figure 6 shows that the 
insider profile of local businesses is not affected by the size of the municipality. Local 
businesses reinforce a formal bargaining strategy (consultation) even in large cities. In 
other cases, the first conclusion is that access to decision making in large cities is much 
costlier than in small cities and therefore voluntary associations, trade unions and the 
Church are all forced to combine insider and outsider strategies. It is also the case that 
these groups need to develop outsider strategies in big cities, so as to have social impact.
Figure 6.
Interest group strategies by number of inhabitants
Note: Responses to the question “What kind of means do the following actors use to achieve their goals in your 
municipality?”. Columns indicate the percentage of mayors who recognize the use of each of the strategies by the 
groups. Percentages are presented in a range from 0 to 1.
Source: 2015 POLLEADER II Survey. Spain.
CONCLUSIONS
The survey of Spanish mayors carried out by the POLLEADER II project offers 
new data on urban power in Spain, confirming the conclusions raised by Navarro 
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(2016). Mayors reject local businesses as the most influential group in the local arena. 
Thus, Spain is framed in the European context where local power is widely distributed 
among institutional actors, political actors and interest groups. We would state, in 
theoretical terms, the existence of pluralistic patterns, although some clarifications are 
worthy of mention. Entrepreneurs are more influential when the mayor’s political 
agenda prioritizes economic development. This would reinforce the idea of an urban 
regime model, although the data show the mayors’ capacity to forge alliances with 
other local actors. In this sense, we cannot state that all Spanish cities are equal in 
terms of the influence of interest groups. Cities with a larger number of inhabitants 
are more exposed to economic dynamics and are more complex. This makes voluntary 
associations and local entrepreneurs more necessary for urban governance. In this 
sense, voluntary associations and entrepreneurs access local government through for-
mal channels, something that the literature on interest groups’ access to decision-mak-
ing poses in a different way.
In a very descriptive way, data show that mayors act as gatekeepers in the promo-
tion of certain interests, depending on political priorities and ideological affinities. In 
this way, the study of urban power in Spain is highly conditioned by political factors.
Mayors’ stances on interest group influence analyzed here should be framed in a 
context with significant differences from the previous round of the survey adminis-
tered to mayors. The deep and prolonged economic crisis was accompanied by a stage 
of mobilization in the main Spanish cities (15M movement) with a critical message on 
democratic institutions. Several political sectors addressed the topic of democratic 
regeneration, demanded political reforms and claimed higher citizen empowerment in 
decision-making. The 2014 European Parliament election provided a window of 
opportunity for new political parties (Ciudadanos and particularly Podemos), which 
transformed the map of actors that stood for the 2015 local elections. Although Pode-
mos did not compete as a party in local elections, its leaders promoted the confluence 
with local social movements in the main Spanish cities. The formula proved appropri-
ate in important cities (Madrid and Barcelona in the first place, but also Zaragoza, 
Cadiz, A Coruña and Santiago de Compostela). Overall, the 2015 local elections ech-
oed the political and social aspirations for regeneration: almost half (48.7 %) of the 
mayors were elected for the first time, while 11.8 % of them had no prior experience 
at the local level. This phenomenon is relevant insofar as there is a current trend to 
bring control over lobbying activities in the local arena (see, for instance, the Madrid 
City Council.) Such discussion is beyond the goal of this article, but local transpar-
ency will undoubtedly be one of the main topics in future research on local power in 
Spain. We want to show some final thoughts in this regard.
Today, there is a broad debate on political corruption and fiscal transparency 
(García-Quesada et al., 2013; Jiménez et al., 2014). Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) 
point to the dissemination of public information as the basis for groups and individ-
uals to participate in decision making since formal competition would not be suffi-
cient to deliver political responsiveness. The focus is no longer on achieving equal 
political participation of the various social groups. The current political and academic 
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debate focuses on how interest groups could achieve greater visibility; how to achieve 
good lobbying regulation to avoid undue influence; and how to deliver accountability 
in the interactions between local governments and interest groups (through the pub-
lication of agendas for elected officials and public subsidies)8.
It seems pertinent to note that one of the possible dimensions of change in Span-
ish local governments is the relationship between local governments and citizens, as 
well as an increase in government transparency. We believe that the publication of the 
mayor’s agenda (with information regarding his/her interviews and contacts and its 
differentiation with respect to acts of institutional representation), as well as the exist-
ence of a register of associations with information on their institutional participation, 
all constitute good indicators. Table 2 identifies key areas of municipal transparency 
in Malaga, Zaragoza, Madrid, Barcelona, and Seville.
Table 2.












Malaga Yes Yes No No No 98.8
Zaragoza Yes Yes No Yes Yes 100
Madrid Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes 92.5
Barcelona Yes** Yes No Yes Yes 100
Seville No*** Yes No Yes No –
Santiago de 
Compostela No Yes No Yes Yes 66.3
* Includes meeting of senior officials; ** Interlocutor not always specified; *** Only the mayor. 
+ Transparency International Spain’s Local Government Transparency Index.
Source: own research.
City governments have made extraordinary progress in the last decade, as evi-
denced by the reports published by Transparency International Spain since 2008. The 
various reports show the main Spanish councils are willing to improve in administra-
tive and financial transparency. The average score in 2008 showed a lack of commit-
ment to transparency (see table 3), which was alarming in terms of democratic quality, 
8. Local governments have established a large number of participatory platforms, including “opin-
ion polls, surveys, focus groups, community panels, public debates, forums, citizens’ juries, 
round tables, invitation to coffee sessions, civic market research and policy studies” (Häikiö, 
2012: 415). By these means, the reforms attempt to “foster the mobilisation of civil society and 
promote the formation of networks and partnerships that can provide a basis for economic and 
social progress” (Pike et al., 2006: 123). 
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especially due to doubts related to the management of financial resources9. The polit-
ical climate seems to have had a huge impact on improving the public image of local 
governments in all areas of local transparency. Yet, some indicators with regard to the 
level of compliance of municipalities concerning the publication of contracts and ten-
ders do not allow identifying a clear variation depending on the partisan orientation 
of the City government.
Table 3.
Transparency International Spain’s Local Government Transparency Index, 
2008-2014
Topic 2008 2009 2010 2012 2014
Global transparency 52.1 64 70.2 70.9 85.2
Corporate portfolios 69.6 71.4 68.1 72.2 86.3
Citizens 69 71.4 77.3 76.3 86.8
Budgets 29.1 49.1 63.8 71.2 90
Contracts 37.3 58.3 70.1 68.6 74.1
Public works, environment 48.4 67 72.2 77.6 85.8
Transparency Law – – – 57.4 81.2
Source: Transparencia Internacional España (http://bit.ly/2oCyqw1).
The question is what might explain the possible variations in the level of transpar-
ency between local governments. Local transparency seems to be determined by polit-
ical competition (partisan competition increases electoral accountability), size of 
municipality (larger cities are more transparent), financial situation (cities with larger 
budgetary debts are less transparent) and the local fiscal capacity (cities collecting 
more taxes are more transparent) (Esteller and Polo-Otero, 2008; Piotrowski and Van 
Ryzin, 2007; Guillamón et al., 2011). Political scandals also help shape government 
transparency. Further research will provide fresh insight into whether higher levels of 
transparency in the interactions between local interest groups and local authorities 
contribute to better local governance in Spanish cities. 
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